In major militay conflicts, matters of logistics are often crucial in Essay

In major militay conflicts, matters of logistics are often crucial in deciding the overall outcome of wars. Discuss with refere - Essay Example The joint delivery lines were not widened and pursued the marine docks with the Royal Navy taking over the Mediterranean. The major apprehension was submarines. Airplanes were not as dominant in World War I as they were in World War II â€Å"to sink a capital ship† (Brown, p. 72, 1998). Throughout World War I, unhampered submarine combat had a considerable force on the capability of Britain's partners to keep distribution paths open, at the same time as the huge volume of the German armed forces showed a lot more for its railways to sustain apart from the time when halted in trench conflict. Logistics, intermittently termed as ‘battle service sustenance’ (Brown, p. 76, 1998), should deal with extremely doubtful circumstances. Whereas ideal estimates are hardly ever achievable, estimates models can decrease vagueness regarding what materials or facilities will be considered necessary, at what place and at what time they will be wanted, or the most excellent method to supply them. Eventually, responsible representatives are required to make results on these issues, at times by means of instinct and logically evaluating substitutes as the circumstances call for and authorize (Shrader, p. 28, 1992). Their decisions should be supported not just by expert understanding of the several facets of logistics itself but as well on the perceptive of the interaction of directly linked armed forces concerns, for instance, line of attack, approaches, aptitude, guidance, recruits, and funding. On the other hand, case studies have revealed that quantitative numerical investigations are mostly an important enhancement on individual decision. One such example is the application of â€Å"Applied Information Economics by the Office of Naval Research and the Marine Corps for forecasting bulk fuel requirements for the battlefield† (Shrader, p. 48, 1992). In most important armed forces clashes, logistics issues are mostly decisive in choosing the general effe ct of conflicts. â€Å"For instance, tonnage war - the bulk sinking of cargo ships - was a crucial factor in World War II† (Shrader, p. 65, 1992). The triumphant united anti-submarine movement in addition to the collapse of the German Navy to drop an adequate amount of shipment within the conflict of the Atlantic permitted Britain to remain in the conflict and set up the subsequent front in opposition to the Nazis; by distinction, the unbeaten U.S. submarine movement in opposition to Japanese marine transport through Asian seas successfully crippled its financial system as well as its armed forces creation potential. More commonly, shielding one's personal delivery lines as well as assaulting those of an opponent is a basic armed forces policy; an illustration of this as an entirely logistical movement for the armed forces way of executing strategic course of action was the Berlin Airlift. Armed forces logistics has initiated a number of procedures that have subsequently turn ed out to be extensively positioned within the profitable world (Creveld, p. 102, 1979). Functions study grew further than World War I

Junior Officers Essay Example for Free

Junior Officers Essay This result appeared to be the same with the statistical results for the data set of all samples combined. The deviation was the item Human Resource Focus, Item 5, which appeared to be not correlated with Leadership, Item 1. There could be logical reasons why such a result, but we cannot at this stage, extrapolate without first conducting the same test for the Leaders Group. A. 3. The Pearson Correlation Matrix for the Leaders Group For the Leaders Group, Leadership, Item 1, is not correlated at all, ALL from Strategic Planning, Item 2 to Business Results, Item 7 as shown by Table 3. Table 3. Excerpt from the Correlation Matrix for the Leaders Group Leadership, Item 1 Strategic Planning, Item 2 0. 371 0. 413 Customer And Market Focus, Item 3 0. 164 0. 726 Measurement, Analysis, and Knowledge Management, Item 4 0. 753 0. 051 Human Resource Focus, Item 5 0. 715 0. 071 Process Management, Item 6 0. 247 0. 594 Business Results, Item 7 0. 524 0. 227 Cell Contents: Pearson correlation p-Value The results were revealing on two counts. First, it told us that the correlation trend shown by the Combined Data Samples of the Others Group and the Leaders Group was mainly due to the effect of the Others Group given its bigger sample size, 37 respondents compared to the Leaders Group, 7 respondents. This is manifest in that the correlation test for the Others Group showed correlation between Leadership, Item 1, and other items except in Customer and Market Focus, Item 3, which was possibly influenced by the results of the Leaders Group which showed no correlation between Leadership, Item 1, and the other items. Second, the results pointed to the contrast between the two groups being compared. There was a significant difference in perception between the Others Group and the Leaders Group. It should be noted that the Leaders Group, comprising, take note, the Senior Leaders, or specifically, the Senior Officers in the surveyed organization occupied the higher hierarchy and when we mentioned the Others Group, we are referring to leaders still, but leaders occupying the lower hierarchy, the Others Group comprising, take note, the Junior Leaders, or specifically the Junior Officers. It may argued that based on their respective position in the surveyed organization, ESGR there may be strong factors which create opposing views or that their perceptions could be affected by the imperatives, necessities, and the like and the nature of their respective positions being held in the organization. Whereas, for the Others Group, wherein Leadership, Item 1, was correlated with all the other items: Strategic Planning, Item 2; Measurement, Analysis, and Knowledge Management, Item 4; Human Resource Focus, Item 5; Process Management, Item 6; and Business Results, Item 7; however, in the Leaders Group, its Leadership, Item 1, had NO significant correlation established with ALL the other items from Item 2 to Item 7. It could mean that the Others Group, mainly Junior Officers were more concerned with function which required them to be aware of all the aspects and details of the organization. It could be contended that Junior Officers were the implementers of the details of projects and operations hence, with Strategic Planning, Item 2 of the Baldrige Criteria, the Junior Officers were more concerned with examining how organizations develop objectives and action plans and how flexible the organization should be in case of situational changes in circumstance. Junior Officers are expected to be familiar with stock knowledge on the planning step and deployment to achieve objectives at the various stages of implementation. Chances are, they are the ones evaluating data from various reports and they are the ones making the progress reports and updates for the higher echelon officers. In other words it is possible that Junior Officers differed with the Senior Leaders in terms of data/details exposure, requiring the Junior Officers to pay more particular attention to the different aspects of the organization at the field or at the ground level. Other items such as Measurement, Analysis and Knowledge Management, Item 4, could be interpreted as part of the functions of Junior Leadership and Junior Officers were more conscious of the procedures involved in handling voluminous data and information which needed sorting and which may require immediate and appropriate response. In Question 26, under the sub-category, Information and Knowledge Management, for example, in dealing with hardware and software reliability, we can expect that senior leadership not to be doing the actual testing of new software or hardware for that matter. It would thus be more the function of Junior Officers to test such new innovations. Due to the difference in focus and priorities between the Others Group and the Leaders Group as suggested by their diverging trend in the correlation test outcome, further tests had to be conducted to enable deeper probe into why such results occurred. How come?

An Introduction To Political Cleavage Concepts Politics Essay

An Introduction To Political Cleavage Concepts Politics Essay The concept of a political cleavage is contested in important ways (Daalder 1966, Eckstein 1966, Dogan 1967, Zuckerman 1982, Bartolini Mair 1990, Neto Cox 1997), and whether cleavages exist in post-communist Eastern Europe might depend substantially on how the term is defined. Some authors who find that cleavages are weak or absent in the region use a rigorous definition of the term (Lawson 1999). It is argued here, however, that even when the definitional barrier is raised to a high level, political cleavages are in all likelihood present in the region(Whitefield 2002). Many studies have found a link between pre-communist historical legacies and institutional choice. For example Kitschelt argues that pre-communist experiences had an influence on the communist regime which ultimately has an impact on party cleavages. Indeed, he argues that pre-communist experiences can be distinguished rather easily, but the length of the political liberalisation phase in the 1980s and the significance of having had two or three rounds of free elections since 1990 may be disputable. While I do not believe that isolating these pre communist legacies is necessarily, I do believe that pre-communist legacies must be included in any analysis of post-communist social cleavages. I suggest that history is very important for the cases of Romania and Hungary. Furthermore, if we go back to Dalton, he insists that religious cleavage has followed the same pattern of decline as for the class cleavage. As he sees, one possible exception to the rule of declining social cleavages involves race and ethnicity. Nevertheless, even today, social, religious and ethic identities of citizens still have explanatory power in examination of voting behavior (Nieuwbeerta, 1998; Knutsen Scarbrough, 1995). The question on the relation between a countries social cleavage structure and political outcomes has become of extra relevance in Eastern European nations after the collapse of totalitarian regimes. Since the velvet revolutions in 1989 the political party structure in these nations had to be build almost from scratch, the question rises, according to Nieuwbeerta(1998), whether these new political systems developed in a way similar to how it is organized in Western nations. Therefore, to what extent are party systems in Eastern European nations based on major socio-economic cleavages in these nations? At first it is seems like that most newly founded parties in Eastern Europe represent such cleavages. For example in Romania and Hungary Social-Democratic and Liberal parties were created, as well as religious and nationalist parties. The concept of a political cleavage, however, is not universally regarded as useful by political observers of the post-communist world (White et al. 1997, Elster et al. 1998). Indeed, in a highly influential and controversial account published soon after the collapse of communist power, Fukuyama (1992) interpreted the event as an indicator of the end of ideological division across all modern societies, East European ones included. The collapse of communism could be seen as demonstrating either broad support for liberalism or, if we want to put the argument negatively, the absence of any alternative method of organizing modern society. From this perspective, although transition in the region would certainly have its winners and losers, the end of ideological competition meant that the political cleavages that had divided populations across industrial societies, most famously characterized by Lipset Rokkan (1967), were anachronistic. Differences among politicians and choices among vot ers would in this context be based on who could best do the job of delivering on liberal, market, and democratic policies(Whitefield 2002). But whether cleavages were envisaged or not, scholarly interest in the cleavage structures (or lack thereof) in post-communist states was often strongly grounded in pessimistic assessments of their putative effects on party competition and on the stability of these new democracies (Cirtautas 1994, Comisso 1997, Elster et al. 1998). According to these ideas, there are at least two important questions that should be answered. First, although the general shape of the cleavage structures of post-communism is better understood, the mechanisms for their formation are unclear or disputed. Most explanations of cleavages in more established democracies emphasize the importance of prior social organization in providing sources of interest and political allegiance among the public that allow coordination of voters and parties in structured and relatively stable ways (Sartori 1969, Przeworski 1985). Such prior social organization, however, was largely absent across Eastern Europe. Second, in order to speak with full confidence about the existence of cleavages, it is necessary to see stability and persistence in social and ideological divisions, but naturally these conditions are only weakly established empirically. There are also differing theoretical expectations about the stability of the social and ideological divisions in politics. Considerable volatility is evident in support for particular parties, and political parties themselves have often been short-lived, offering voters little opportunity to reward or punish them. But is this volatility of supply and demand for parties a sign of instability in the cleavage structure? For many countries, there is limited evidence available to test these possibilities because follow-up studies that might allow over-time comparisons have not yet taken place; however, it should be noted that where such evidence is available, it points to more stability than change in the structure of underlying social and ideological di visions, which strengthens claims about the existence of cleavages in the region and especially in Romania and Hungary. 2. The cleavage hypothesis If we want to understand the idea and the formation of cleavages, we should first find appropriate explanation. Party nationalisation might be explained as a consequence of the territorial structure of social or socio-economic divides (Lipset Rokkan, 1967). Caramani (2004, p. 15) addresses the centre-periphery and the urban-rural cleavage as territorial divides, connected to low levels of nationalisation. In contrast, functional cleavages, such as the economic cleavage in Western Europe, do not have a territorial character, so that parties organising along such cleavages are highly nationalised (cf. Caramani, 2004; Cox, 1999, p. 159). The explanation of party system structures by cleavages has been criticised though, because cleavages do not convert into parties as a matter of course, but this is produced by the political system itself (Zielinski, 2002, p. 187). Looking at Central and Eastern Europe, only a few scholars are looking for similarities of political divisions with social cleavages in Western democracies (Kitschelt et al., 1999). The view overwhelms that cleavages, especially if they are narrowly defined, are of limited relevance in the region (Elster et al., 1998, pp. 247-270). However, one social divide appears to be an exception to the rule: The ethnic divide is salient in Central and Eastern Europe (Evans Need, 2002) and helps many parties to mobilise their voters (Elster et al., 1998, p. 252). Ethnic minorities exist in almost all countries, and they vote in large numbers for their own parties. Furthermore, issues related to ethnicity help as well nationalist parties of the titular nation to mobilise their voters. The investigation of ethnic divides in order to explain party nationalisation degrees may yield promising results, as many of the ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern European countries are territorially settled. If such ethnic divides become manifest in party politics, then the ethnic structure of a country will explain why the electoral strength of political parties varies across regions. If we take into account the cases with Romania and Hungary, the best example could be inter-war Transylvania- the large ethnic Hungarian and German minorities constituted approximately 40% of the population, and all of the minorities were either Catholic or Protestant. If we add to this figure the number of Romanians that belonged to the Greek Catholic Church, then approximately 70% of Transylvanias population belonged to a Western Christian denomination prior to the communist takeover. These figures are important because, as Kitschelt argues, these pre-communist legacies influenced the communist reform process. In the case of Transylvania and Galicia these cultural and religious differences had a marked impact on the regions during the communist period. Nevertheless, Transylvania has traditionally been perceived, even during the communist period, as ethnically, culturally and politically different from the rest of the country. Therefore in order to assimilate Transylvania, nationali sm was an important ideological component of Romanian communism, particularly under Ceausescu. He promoted a form of national populism characterised by pseudo-egalitarianism and the non-recognition of any kind of diversity'(Whitefield 2002). However, the existence of diversity across post-communist states in the content of political competition is not evidence for diversity in cleavage structures. Support for political parties may vary as a result of many factors, discussed below, that are not connected to cleavages. And even if partisanship appears to be rooted in ideological and social differentiation, this may not result from social and ideological divisions in the population but rather from party strategies(Whitefield 2002). According to the empirical investigation, that Whitefield and Evans had done, there is a relationship among social and ideological differences and partisanship that would be expected if political cleavages were present. Naturally, although economic differentiation was common to all countries (if not always to the same degree), not all social identities and differentiated social experiences were equally present in all states; in particular, the religious and ethnic composition of countries in the region varies markedly. As a consequence, we found that the connection of social division to ideological division also varies; religiosity appears to matter much more to social liberalism in Catholic than in Orthodox states; and issues of ethnic rights are more firmly socially rooted where minorities exist and where the sense of social difference between ethnic groups is more strongly felt. This variation in the nature of social and ideological division is important because it appears to rela te to the nature of divisions that emerge in support for political parties(Whitefield 2002). TABLE 1: Political cleavages in post-Communist Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary): social and ideological divisions to partisanship Social bases Ideological bases Romania 1. Age, region (Bucharest), education 2. Ethnicity (Hungarians) economic liberalism, pro/anti-West 3. Region (Transylvania) 1. Social political liberalism, economic liberalism, pro/anti West 2. Ethnic liberalism 3. Pro-West, Jews Bulgaria 1. Ethnicity(Turkish) 2. Age, Class( professionals vs. workers) 3. Religiosity 1. Economic liberalism, pro/anti-West 2. Ethnic liberalism 3. Nationalism, Gypsies Hungary 1. Age 2. Religiosity 3. Class (urban-rural), education/class, settlement size, denomination(Protestant) 1. Economic liberalism, pro/anti-West 2. Social political liberalism, Jews 3. Social political liberalism, nationalism 3. Politics between economy and culture- the case of Hungary In order to continue to analyze the formation of cleavages in Eastern European states, I will try to give example with Hungary. Before that, I would like to point out some of the most important theories of Stein Rokkan linked with the work of S. M. Lipset. As a consequence of the early death of S. Rokkan, his work, in spite its richness and extension, can not be regarded as finished. Here are the basic ideas: 1. Territory as a key concept of politics in a cross pressure between culture and economy, implying: the equal weight given to economic, political-territorial and cultural dimensions; the interaction between geographical spaces and socio-cultural membership spaces, between center formation and boundary building; the conceptual map of Europe with an West-East axis differentiating between economic conditions for state-building and a South-North axis between cultural conditions for nation-building. 2. The identification of four cleavages following the critical junctures of: the national revolution creating the center-periphery and the church-state cleavages; the industrial revolution creating the urban-rural and the labour-capital cleavages. 3. The cyclical movement of cleavages: towards a national-international divide. It is often forgotten that Rokkan does not end his cleavage sequence with the worker-owner conflict of the industrial revolution, but points to an intriguing cyclical movement: breakdown of a supranational order (Roman Empire) establishment of culturally and politically distinctive nation states conflict over national versus international loyalties. (Lipset-Rokkan 47-48) Although the last formulation relates to the communist cleavage within the labour movement (not relevant any more), but in his latest works he points to the centrality of a reformulated version of a center-periphery divide: that between homogenizing supranational standardization and cultural distinctiveness, roots, national identity. ( Rokkan- Urwin, Flora 1983: 434). 4. The different political impacts of a gradual, organic sequence of cleavages ( in most of North Western Europe) versus the cumulation of state and nation-building cleavages together with the rapidity of enfranchisement and sudden modernization. The second alternative especially in the case of the discontinuity of or threats to national independence implies difficulties in transition to mass democracy. (Hungary is directly mentioned by Rokkan in this latter context.) Territorial-cultural conflicts do not just find political expression in secessionist and irredentist movements, however, they feed into the overall cleavage structure and help to condition the development not only of each party organization but even more of the entire system of party oppositions and interests (Lipset-Rokkan 41). 5. The historical long term continuity of collective political identities coalitions and oppositions on the level of alternatives, of parties and of the support market to be mobilized. Parties do not simply present themselves de novo to the citizens at each election; they each have a history and so have the constellations of alternatives they present to the electorate. (Lipset-Rokkan). Emerging cleavages affect, however, former alliances and restructure the party system. Rokkan points also to the existence of a certain lee-way for parties to translate social cleavages. 6. The freezing of party alternatives with the final extension of suffrage (mostly in the twenties), implying the inclusion of the lower classes. In contrast to an expanding support market with a creative phase of parties (Cotta 102) accompanied by a mobilization along cultural and territorial cleavages, the mobilization on the basis of purely economic cleavages comes only afterwards (Rokkan 1980: 118). The stage of mass democracy brings about an ever more closed electoral market with a mobilization controlled by the already existing parties. 7. The special role of social democratic parties on the left side of the labour-capital cleavage. Due to their strength and domesticability, their ability to maintain unity in the face of the man forces making for division and fragmentation (Lipset-Rokkan: 46), social democratic parties and the class cleavage in itself played a stabilizing and homogenizing, cohesive influence in most West European party systems. In countries with a troubled history of nation-building, marked cultural cleavages reduced their potentials. But the very logic of pluralism in democratic capitalism helped their entry into national politics. These parties, having joined the nation contributed to the neutralization of the radicalizing effects of sudden industrialization. (Lipset-Rokkan: 46, 48, 50). 8. The radical rightist anti-system cleavage. The rising networks of new elites, such as the leaders of the new large bureaucracies of industry and government, those who control the various sectors of the communication industry, the heads of mass organizations, the leaders of once weak or low-status groups, and the like constitute the focus of protest of fascist-type parties, which: are nationalistic, they venerate the nation and its culture; are anti-democratic; want to unite their supporters as one single pillar lead by deeply felt convictions about the destiny and the mission of the nation. These xenophobic and racist parties may mobilize segments of the middle and lower classes. As to their emergence and chances of success, contrasts in the continuity and regularity of nation-building certainly played a role (Lipset-Rokkan 23, 24, 25). After we pointed out some of the most important ideas from the Lipset and Rokkan concept, now I will try to form several important assumptions: The evolution of the Hungarian party system confirms the classical sequence of European cleavage formation with the initial and decisive emergence of identity-based territorial and cultural divides followed later by the appearance of economic cleavages. Hungarian party competition seems to reflect and even to anticipate new developments of Western party systems. There are real historical alternatives expressing different conceptions of modernization, of nationhood and of geopolitical location represented by the parties. For Rokkan and Lipset, party alternatives and the party system itself freeze. In Hungary and in some other Eastern European countries, intervals, parties and party structure are unstable and fluid. But the alternatives contained in the cleavage structure are amazingly stable: not the party system, but the cleavage structure is frozen. In the formation process of the parties (1988-89), in the subsequent three elections from 1990 to 1998, the same cleavage sets have mattered and structured party competition, namely: the three cleavage families of Westernization vs. traditionalism, post-communism vs. anti-post-communism and pro-market commodification (winners) vs. welfare statist decommodification (losers). This special freezing of alternatives and cleavages has, however, taken place in the context of a very much open and available electoral market . This deviance from the Rokkan-Lipset freezing pattern is the unavoidable consequence of the long discontinuity of the party system, the lack of traditions of mass democracy and the unstable interest structure of civil society. Due to the strong economic, social and political positions of the post-communist elites and surviving value orientations in the electorate, the definition of the rules of the game as a systemic issue (Offe 1991, Mair 1997) is expressed by the salience of a post-communism anti-post-communism cleavage family. It cannot be deducted from the Rokkan-Lipset scheme, and by its very nature, cannot become a long-enduring historical divide, but can be supposed to fade away. The taming of capitalism, the political regulation of the market with a political mobilization along a commodification decommodification axis is a crucial point of democratic consolidation and legitimacy. Following from the freezing of the Hungarian political cleavage structure in the phase of the dominance of the cultural-territorial and post-communist cleavage families, the increasing importance of this socio-economic divide is coupled with its absorption by or inclusion into the other two cleavage families. The post-1989 evolution of the Hungarian party system has brought about no political mobilization along the line of a classical labour-capital class cleavage. Finally, we should now indicate the main cleavages formed in Hungary, according to Mair: 1. The family of territorial and cultural cleavages Traditionalist forces stress historical continuity, Hungarian nationhood, favour community ove society, are for strong authority, strong church. Their value orientations are more particularist than universalist, they have an inclination to love the rural, even if they are urban Westernizers are outward-looking, for catch-up modernization, they favour individualism, multicultural diversity, they stress secularism and human rights. 2. The family of post-communist cleavages This set of cleavages has several dimensions an ideological dimension of anticommunism which can be based either on particularist national, religious identities or on the universalism of individual human rights and rationality; a political dimension expressed in the relationship to the Socialist Party looked upon as the successor party; a power dimension of competing elites and of the re-definition of the rules of the game outside and inside politics; a structural dimension reflecting the symbiotic dualism of the present society with a secto rooted in late communism and a sector of emerging capitalism iv; an emotional and biographical dimension with a population split into two halves: one half who feel they lived better in the last years of real socialism and another half thinking differently. 3. The family of socio-economic cleavages With economic transformation progressing and with an overwhelmingly materialist electorate this set of cleavages has become central in the society, but the early freezing of the party system structured along the above mentioned two cleavage sets is still complicating the clear translation of this divide into programmatic and public policy alternatives. 4. Old Theories vs. New Parties: Romania Post-communist party system Surprisingly, post-communist cleavages in Romania have been the spotlight of relatively little attention. Indeed, as Crowther writes: If skeptics are correct, Romania should stand out as a strong case for the inapplicability of social cleavage analyses. Because of the peculiarities of its pre-communist and communist past, Romania is often taken as an archetypical example of the post-communist countries dearth of civil society. Or, in other words, it is almost impossible to test the theory of Stein Rokkan or S.M. Lipset, without necessary sharing Crowthers point of view on the inapplicability of social cleavage analyses. Most recent works on the concept à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾post-communist cleavages commence with a few comments on Lipsets and Rokkans cleavage theory applied to the case of Central Europe. One of the most respectful professors from Bulgaria- Georgi Karasimeonov indicates that Lipsets and Rokkans cleavage theory was formulated on the special conditions and terms of a particular European western model. Karasimeonov contributions to the debate can be interpreted in the tradition of the analysis of the electoral behavior and party formation in transnational societies revealing at least four types of cleavages: residual (historical), transitional, actual and potential8. De Waele, seeks to clarify and categorize the relationship between the original theory of cleavages as it is applied to Western model and the post-communist experience undertaking his project with the view of three cleavages: 1. The first set of objective considerations influencing the emergence of the post-communist party system concerns the economic cleavage. De Waelle argues that the socio-economic cleavage (à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾maximalist vs. à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾minimalist) comes from the communist regimes successful orientation towards destruction of the capitalist economy. De Waele himself flags up this problem with his own definition: the term à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾maximalist is used to describe the adherents of a fast transition. In theory, the claim that the à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾minimalist perspective is likely to have a socioeconomic basis has been highly dependent upon overall record of mixed progress with uneven and slow reform implementation. On the contrary, the à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾maximalists represented the turning point for the post-communism. à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾The maximalists launched new reform programs, a macroeconomic plan stabilization and structural reforms, an ambitious shock therapy for the Romanian economy, including the liberalization of prices and the foreign exchange market as well as the accelerati on of the privatization. 2. The second cleavage, the so-called à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾authoritariandemocratic divide, refers to the inability of a significant part of the society to renounce in discursive terms the communist legacy (although, in Romania this did not necessarily translate into a rejection of all kind of authoritarian attitudes). In many recent studies on authoritarian attitudes in postcommunist Romania, researchers have pointed the electoral success of Vadim Tudor in 2000, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾as a distinctly unpleasant surprise for many in the West. The case in point was the increase of supporters of a latent antipluralist attitude towards the European values arena. 3. The third cleavage line is between the communists and the anticommunists. The à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾old attitude, a so-called à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾pre-communist behavior was usually reactivated after the emergence of the new parties. Given the discontinuity of the transition, à gh concludes that the confrontation between the two groups led to the formation of a multi-party and the à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾first generation parties. He also witnessed the fact that the new parties were formed à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾as second generation parties, and the third category, the so-called small à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾third generation appeared much later. In a similar way, Gill argues that it is difficult to establish the real significance of the cleavage between the two types. He also indicates there have been at least three referential ways to see post-communism: à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾post-communism as a system, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾post-communism as a condition, à ¢Ã¢â€š ¬Ã… ¾post-communism as a situation. After this analysis of the main three cleavages that the Romanian post-communist system has experienced, it is almost impossible at this point to raise the discussion of a consolidated democracy. With politics in Romania still changing, the outlines of the three families of cleavages advanced in this article constitute a significant obstacle towards consolidation. 5. Conclusion Finally I would like to go back to some of the main points I have presented: The evolution of the Eastern European party system confirms the classical sequence of European cleavage formation with the initial and decisive emergence of identity-based territorial and cultural divides, with their dominance over socio-economic divides followed later by the appearance of economic cleavages. The salient manifestation of the cumulation of cultural and territorial cleavages in the part system corresponds clearly with the cyclical movement in the framework of the Rokkanian scheme demonstrating how globally the centrality of a national-supranational divide. The example with Hungarian party competition seems to reflect and even to anticipate new developments of Western party systems. There are real historical alternatives expressing different conceptions of modernisation, of nationhood and of geopolitical location represented by the parties. These alternatives are olde than the most of the Eastern European electorate, but they deviate from the mainstream in Western Europe. In the formation process of the parties (1988-89), in the subsequent three elections from 1990 to 1998, the same cleavage sets have mattered and structured party competition, namely: the three cleavage families of Westernization vs. traditionalism, post-communism vs. anti-post-communism and marketization, commodification (winners) vs. welfare statism. This special freezing of alternatives and cleavages has, however, taken place in the context of a very much open and available electoral market . This deviance from the Rokkan-Lipset freezing pattern is the unavoidable consequence of the long discontinuity of the party system, the lack of traditions of mass democracy and the unstable interest structure of civil society. The post-1989 evolution of the Hungarian and Romania party system has brought about no political mobilisation along the line of a classical labour-capital class cleavage. Instead, I have observed the following attempts for bringing the welfare statist decommodification cleavage in: coupling it with the post-communist cleavage, coupling it with the defence of national identity, coupling it with the religious cleavage, coupling (its radical variant) with an aggressive and racist social nationalism. After all, I still believe that formation of cleavages in East Europe, according to the thesis of Lipset and Rokkan, is almost impossible to apply to these countries. However, the cases which I in detail discussed (Hungary and Romania), are the best example for the existing of cleavages in Eastern European states. Therefore, indicates that even the model of Lipset-Rokkan was more applicable for Western European countries, especially because of different economical and political development, the existing of cleavages in East Europe was possible even before 1989, and the model is still useful nowadays.

Effect of marajuana on college campus :: essays research papers

  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Marijuana can be found on every college campus in the United States and is the drug of choice coming in right behind alcohol. Harvard School of public health conducted a survey over the last eleven years and found that marijuana use in college has gone from 26.4 % in 1989-1991 to 33.6% in 2000 (http://www.edc.org/hec/pubs/prev-updates/marijuana.html). According to a similar study, the majority of students on college campuses that use marijuana will also participate in other high risk activities. This destructive behavior includes things such as cigarette smoking, binge drinking and sex while intoxicated. Marijuana is so easy to obtain and can be very tempting to experiment with, especially if you have already had a few drinks and your thinking is impaired.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Marijuana prices have a major effect on the amount of use by college students at any given point in time. Although it may be more socially available on college campuses, the price still determines the usage. The fact that marijuana is illegal in the United States helps to keep the price at a seemingly higher level. This artificial price illusion regulates the buying, selling and usage among college students. Compared to alcohol, marijuana is much more accessible, especially on college campuses. Getting alcohol requires an ID or someone with an ID. Getting marijuana only requires someone that supplies the drug. So even though it is illegal, marijuana is seemingly more common.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Since possession of marijuana is illegal, it is not surprising that the consequences can be so debilitating. While attending college with federal financial aid, you run the risk of jeopardizing your federal aid by being charged with a misdemeanor. Possession of marijuana is considered a misdemeanor and if you are charged, the federal government has the right to take away any government aid that you were granted. So not only do you have a record for possession, but more than likely you are going through the judicial system of the college or university and may be suspended or expelled.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Marijuana use can also lead to academic problems. Students that participate in these behaviors have a tendency to spend more time socializing than concentrating on what they should be, their academics. These students spend more time partying than studying which greatly affects their academic performance. Two of the physical effects of marijuana that directly affect academics are difficulty in problem solving and poor memory. Students may become less and less motivated to be involved in campus activities, and also may become decreasingly concerned with their long-term goals and career plans.

Julius Caesar Group Project

Julius Caesar Group Project: Analyzing Diction on Marc Antony’s Speech 1. Overall I would classify Marc Antony’s speech as largely monosyllabic as a whole in length. This took a much longer time to decide than it did of Brutus’ speech, this could be that Antony is a smarter and nobler person or that it’s just how Julius Caesar constructed the speech to persuade the crowd. One of the lines that demonstrate a great use of one syllable would be â€Å"My heart is in the coffin there with Caesar and I must pause ‘till it come back to me† (Shakespeare, Lines 108-109).This is just one of the many lines that uses a lot of one syllable words but in the end the speech was mainly one syllable in length. 2. Antony’s speech uses a very well use of both techniques of persuading and informing. I felt that there was more use of persuading in his speech than informing but that’s only because they love Antony at the end of the speech. An example o f informing from Antony is, â€Å"I come to bury Caesar not praise him† (Shakespeare, Line 2) Here he is just telling the audience and conspirators that he is just trying to give a simple Funeral.Antony is clever with his words by bluntly saying things and letting the audience’s mind go off and feel that things are correct. It’s not just the Audience that persuades themselves he says, â€Å"Did this in Caesar seem ambitious? † (Shakespeare, Line 92). Giving examples and then asking questions to play with their minds was a very successful tactic of Antony’s. 3. I felt that Antony’s diction was very formal in his speech; unlike Brutus the crowd does not respond in his speech.Antony uses advance word choice, which makes him look more intelligent to the not so intelligent clump of Romans. An excellent example of his formal diction would be, â€Å" So let it be with Caesar. The Noble Brutus hath told you Caesar was ambitious: if it were so, it w as a grievous fault, and grievously hath Caesar answer’d it† (Shakespeare, lines 79-82) the words such as grievous and ambitious show formal diction. Diction like Antony’s override’s Brutus’ speech with repititon which makes their mind believe that â€Å"WOW!This really is impressive and he’s right! † although he does fall short with not letting the audience get in some action of their own opinion. 4. Antony is very wise and really gets people in his speech in Act 3 Scene 2 by using denotative examples and not â€Å"what if† and â€Å"in general† meanings. He not only gives specific examples on how things should be but also on how things shouldn’t be which is genius like of Antony to portray pros and cons. Lines 90 and 91 re perfect examples of specifics he tells us, â€Å"He hath brought many captives home to Tome whose ransoms did the general coffers fill†¦. † (Shakespeare, Line 90-91) Antony uses end less examples but this one stuck out to me most. 5. Going back to specifics, my feelings have not changed, Antony is lousy with specifics that make his speech concrete. Another one of his detailed specific would be from line 93 where he states, â€Å" When the poor have cried, Caesar hath wept:† (Shakespeare, Line 93).Not only is this fact dead one but also it involves pathos and makes Caesar look even better! 6. One of Antony’s tactics also for his great speech was the euphonious tone/ word choice he used. Typically when you use a nice/pleasant tone with people, they will give you what you want. One of the more highlighting parts of the euphonious words was in line 89 where he declares, â€Å"And Brutus is an honourable man. †. Even though Antony disagreed very highly of Brutus and the conspirators he still followed the rule Brutus gave him and used very appreciative words with the crowd. . According to Marc Antony’s diction I do feel that he does achiev e his overall purpose for the crowd to like him, honor Caesar, and strongly hate Brutus and the conspirators. He succeeds this overall purpose by being clever and tricky with his words by speaking against Brutus he falls short by not using as much emotion. The greater part of his speech was most definitely greater than any other part of his speech.

Business Administration Education and Careers

Business Administration Education and Careers What Is Business Administration? Business administration involves the performance, management, and administrative functions of business operations. Many companies have multiple departments and personnel that can fall under the business administration heading. Business administration can encompass: Finance: The finance department manages money (both incoming and outgoing) and other financial resources for a business.Economics: An economist monitors and predicts economic trends.  Human Resources: A human resources department helps to manage human capital and benefits. They plan and direct many key administrative functions of a business.Marketing: The marketing department develops campaigns to bring in customers and improve brand awareness.Advertising: The advertising department finds ways to promote a business or the businesss products and services.Logistics: This department works to get products to consumers by coordinating  people, facilities, and supplies.Operations: An operations manager oversees the day-to-day operations of a business.Management: Managers may supervise projects or people. In a hierarchical  organization, managers may work  in low-level management, middle-level management, and top-level management. Business Administration Education Some business administration jobs require advanced degrees; others require no degree at all. This is why there are many different business administration education options. You could benefit from on-the-job training, seminars, and certificate programs. Some business administration professionals also choose to earn an associates, bachelors, masters, or even a doctoral degree. The education option you choose should depend on what you want to do in a business administration career. If you want a job at the entry-level, you may be able to begin work while you get an education. If you would like to work in management or a supervisory position, some formal education may be required before a job appointment. Here is a breakdown of the most common business administration education options. On-the-Job Training: Training is provided on-the-job. Unlike many of the other options below, you are typically paid for the on-the-job training and do not have to pay tuition. Training time can vary depending on the job.Continuing Education: Continuing education may be provided through colleges, universities, business schools, and other academic institutions. You may take courses or a short seminar to earn continuing education credits or a certificate of completion.Certificate Programs: Certificate programs tend to focus on a very specific topic, such as customer service or tax accounting. These programs are generally offered through colleges, universities, business schools, and other academic institutions. Tuition is often cheaper for a certificate program than it is for a degree program. The amount of time it takes to complete a program varies; most programs are one month to one year in duration.Associates Degree in Business Administration: An Associate in Business Administration can be earned from a college, university, or business school. You should seek out an accredited program with a curriculum that covers topics you need to know or are interested in. Most associates programs take two years to complete. Bachelors Degree in Business Administration: A Bachelor in Business Administration is a minimum requirement for many jobs in the business field. This type of degree can be earned from a college, university, or business school and typically takes four years of full-time study to complete. Accelerated and part-time programs are available. A bachelors program in business administration sometimes offers opportunities to specialize.Masters Degree in Business Administration: A Master in Business Administration, also known as an MBA degree, is an advanced degree option for business majors. An MBA may also be a minimum requirement for some jobs in the business field. Accelerated programs take one year to complete. Traditional MBA programs take two years to complete. Part-time options are also available. Many people choose to earn this degree from a business school, but a masters program can be found at many other colleges and universities with graduate-level study options.Doctorate Degree in Business Administration: A doctorate or Ph.D. in Business Administration is the highest business degree that can be earned. This option is best for students who are interested in teaching or pursuing field research. A doctorate degree generally requires four to six years of study. Business Certifications There are a number of different professional certifications or designations available to people in the business administration field. Most can be earned after completing your education or after working in the field for a specific amount of time. In most cases, such certifications are not required for employment but can help you look more attractive and qualified to potential employers. Some examples of business administration certifications include: Certified Business Manager (CBM): This certification is ideal for business generalists, MBA grads, and non-MBA grads who want a business credential.PMI Certifications: The Project Management Institute (PMI) offers several certification options for project managers at all skill and education levels.HRCI Certifications: The Human Resources Certification Institutes offers several certifications for human resources professionals at varying levels of expertise.Certified Management Accountant: The Certified Management Accountant (CMA) credential is awarded to accountants and financial professionals in the business. There are a lot of other certifications that can be earned as well. For example, you can earn certifications in computer software applications that are commonly used in business administration. Word processing or spreadsheet related certifications can be valuable assets for people seeking an administrative position in the business field. See more professional business certifications  that could make you more marketable to employers.   Business Administration Careers Your career options in business administration will depend largely on your education level as well as your other qualifications. For example, do you have an associates, bachelors, or masters degree?  Do you have any certifications? Do you have prior work experience in the field? Are you a capable leader? Do you have a record of proven performance? What special skills do you have? All of these things determine whether or not you are qualified for a specific position. That said, many different jobs may be open to you in the business administration field. Some of the most popular options include: Accountant: Industries include tax preparation, payroll accounting, bookkeeping services, financial accounting, accounting management, government accounting, and insurance accounting.Advertising Executive: Advertising executives and managers are needed to create, coordinate, and roll out advertising campaigns for every type of business that offers a product or service.Business Manager: Business managers are employed by both small and large companies; opportunities are available at every level of managementfrom department supervisor to operations management.Finance Officer: Finance officers can be employed by any business that has money coming in or going out. Positions vary from entry-level to management.Human Resources Manager: Government employs the largest percentage of human resources managers. Positions are also available in company management, manufacturing, professional and technical services, health care fields, and social service agencies.Management Analyst: Most management analysts are self-employed. About 20 percent work for small or large consulting firms. Management analysts can also be found in government and the finance and insurance industries. Marketing Specialist: Every business industry employs marketing specialists. Career opportunities also exist with research firms, civic organizations, academic institutions, and government agenciesOffice Administrator: Most office administrators work in educational services, healthcare, state and local government, and insurance. Positions also exist in professional services and within almost any office setting.Public Relations Specialist: Public relations specialists can be found in any business industry. Many career opportunities can also be found within government, healthcare, and religious and civic organizations.